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Abstract 
This paper develops a SAM database encompassing 6,002 representative Vietnamese 
households, mapping one-to-one with 16 aggregate households. The database is used 
to calibrate two Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models with respectively 16 
aggregate and 6,002 disaggregate households. Aggregate model results are com-
pared to those of the disaggregated model to demonstrate the importance of endoge-
nous modelling of micro households within a static CGE model framework. The 
methodology of relying on a consistent micro-household data-set achieves the twin 
objectives of allowing for changes in the distribution of household expenditures and 
the possibility of computing poverty measures at a very disaggregate level. As such, 
we aim at contributing with methodological advances in the assessment of the poverty 
impact of macro-policies.  
 
Standard changes in trade policy are in focus in this paper. Poverty measures used 
are, however, re-normalised versions of traditional Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
poverty measures. We argue that FGT poverty measures should be normalised on the 
number of poor individuals within a given group rather than on the group population. 
Our simulations indicate that poverty will rise following a revenue-neutral lowering 
of trade taxes, which we interpret as a worst case scenario. This leads us to suggest 
that the government should be proactive in combining trade liberalization efforts with 
a proper fiscal response in order to avoid increasing poverty in the short- to medium-
term. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the Spatial Inequality in Asia Conference organized by the World In-
stitute of Development Economics Research (WIDER) on 28-29 March, 2003 at the United Na-
tions University (UNU) in Tokyo, Japan. It was prepared within the research project entitled 
“WTO Negotiations and Changes in Agricultural and Trade Policies: Consequences for Develop-
ing Countries” implemented by the Danish Research Institute for Food Economics (FØI) and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Financial support from Danida is gratefully 
acknowledged. Views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to their af-
filiated institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Vietnam has come a long way since the doi moi reforms were initiated in 1986. Wide-
ranging institutional changes have been initiated, and Vietnam has, in parallel with 
domestic reforms, started a process of opening up its economy to regional and global 
economic forces. “Openness” to trade as measured by the share of imports and ex-
ports to GDP grew considerably during the 1990s. Nevertheless, average tariff rates 
have increased over the same period from 10.7 percent in 1992 to 16.2 percent in 
2000 (Niimi, Vasudeva-Dutta, and Winters, 2002). Increased tariff-barriers are not 
consistent with Vietnam’s commitment to continuing and deepening the process of 
trade liberalisation. Vietnam is a major world market actor in several important agri-
cultural sectors including coffee, pepper and rice, but is not yet a member of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Membership has, however, become a priority 
since China joined the WTO as its 143rd member in 2001. It is clear that Vietnam will 
be faced with stern demands for trade liberalisation before it can join the WTO. It is 
also becoming clear that Vietnam might be willing to pay the price in terms of policy 
choices. Proactive integration in the international economy was a declared aim emerg-
ing from the Ninth Party Congress. Thus, there is an increasing need to understand 
how impending trade liberalisation may affect the relative well being of poor Viet-
namese people throughout the country.  
 
Measuring the poverty impact of macro policy interventions within a CGE model 
framework has recently been studied by Decaluwé et al. (1999). They use a specific 
statistical distribution function as an approximation to the distribution of income 
within aggregate household groups. In particular, they argue that the beta distribution 
represents a sufficiently flexible functional form so as to provide a more appropriate 
functional specification for within-household income distribution than the lognormal 
and Pareto distributions which have previously been studied (Adelman and Robinson, 
1979; de Janvry, Sadoulet and Fargeix, 1991). 
 
Our study takes another approach by solving for the entire distribution of income 
among a representative set of 6,002 households surveyed in the most recently avail-
able Vietnamese Living Standards Survey (VLSS98). We compare two different ap-
proaches to modelling the income distribution of micro-households. The first relies on 
a top-down procedure by modelling 16 aggregate households followed by consistent 
disaggregation of income and expenditures among the 6,002 micro-households. Con-
sistency with aggregate household expenditures is maintained by adjusting average 
household expenditure shares at the micro level. The second approach avoids consis-
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tency problems by modelling income and expenditure decisions separately for each of 
the 6,002 micro-households. It also allows for feedback-effects from changes in the 
micro level distribution of income and expenditures to macro level variables. We 
compare the two modelling approaches in order to investigate the importance of mi-
cro-household feedback-effects. Each of the two modelling approaches relies on a 
consistent micro-household data-set. In this way, both allow for detailed assessments 
of the poverty impact of macro policies, without having to rely on distributional ap-
proximations regarding intra-household income and assumptions to shift these distri-
butions in relation to changes in macro variables. 
 
Our main purpose is to study the relative impact on poverty of reductions in trade 
taxes. In this regard we experiment with different kinds of government budget clo-
sures to judge the poverty impact of various government options to maintain a bal-
anced budget. Most of our analyses are carried out under a plausible revenue-neutral 
government budget closure where lost revenue from reduced trade taxes is made up 
by increasing household taxes. The analyses in this paper are based on a recently de-
veloped 2000 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and micro-household information 
from the VLSS98 household survey. Two CGE models – one aggregate and one dis-
aggregate - is established on this basis and used to analyse the poverty impact of trade 
liberalization. We use adjusted Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) measures as the basis 
for our analyses. The normalisation of the traditional FGT measures means that they 
cannot be compared across regions and by extension across countries. We therefore 
rely extensively on adjusted FGT poverty measures, including the poverty headcount 
(P0), and adjusted poverty gap (P1*), and poverty depth (P2*) measures, which are 
comparable among household sub-groupings. 
 
Section 2 presents the SAM data set, the CGE models we use in our experiments, and 
a review of our use of the FGT poverty measures.  Section 3 summarizes the results 
of our experiments, including an evaluation of the two aggregate and disaggregate 
modelling alternatives, and a discussion of how reduced trade taxes will affect pov-
erty across different household groups characterised by location (rural/urban), and the 
employment status (farmer, self-employed/wage-worker/non-employed) of the head 
of household. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Data and model framework 
The data underlying the current analyses is the 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Sur-
vey (VLSS98) and the 2000 Vietnam Social Accounting Matrix (VSAM) established 
by Tarp, Roland-Holst, Rand, and Jensen (2002). The VSAM includes accounts for 
97 activities and commodities, 14 factors, 16 aggregate households, and three enter-
prises as well as accounts for the current government budget, capital accumulation, 
inventories, and the balance of payments. The 14 factors include capital and land in 
addition to 12 different kinds of labour categorised according to gender 
(male/female), location (rural/urban) and educational level (low/medium/high). Simi-
larly, the 16 kinds of households are categorised according to location (rural/urban), 
gender of the head of household (male/female), and employment status of the head of 
household (farmer/self-employed/wage-worker/non-employed). 
 
The disaggregation of the aggregate VSAM household account into 16 separate 
household accounts was based on information from VLSS98. This survey includes 
6,002 households making up a countrywide representative sample of households. The 
first step was to categorise the 6,002 micro-households into the 16 aggregate house-
hold categories to be included in VSAM. Based on a mapping, which allocated each 
micro-household to one and only one of the 16 aggregate household categories, in-
formation on micro-level income and expenditure patterns of the 6,002 micro-
households were aggregated to derive priors for the income and expenditure patterns 
of the 16 aggregate household categories. This information was subsequently used in 
deriving the consistent VSAM matrix. 
 
The fundamental mapping between the 16 aggregate VSAM households and the 6,002 
micro VLSS households was in turn used to establish a consistent economy wide 
Vietnamese SAM data set with 6,002 micro households. Since each aggregate house-
hold was made up of a unique set of micro households, the main issue was how to 
disaggregate each aggregate household among its component micro households. The 
problem of disaggregating the household account into micro households therefore 
consisted of 16 sub-problems – one for each of the 16 aggregate households in 
VSAM. Each problem represented a standard problem in achieving consistency 
among SAM data accounts: The double-entry book-keeping principle of maintaining 
consistency between income and expenditures was fulfilled for the aggregate VSAM 
household account, but not for the individual micro households. 
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In order to achieve consistency for each of the micro household accounts, the method 
of minimum cross entropy, proposed in Golan, Judge and Robinson (1994), was re-
lied on. This statistical method was used to minimize the entropy distance between 
the prior income and expenditure shares, derived from VLSS98, and the ex post in-
come and expenditure shares, derived to ensure accounting consistency for each mi-
cro household. In addition, the statistical method ensured consistency with other eco-
nomic flow accounts in VSAM, by imposing the aggregate household income and ex-
penditure patterns as fixed control totals. 
 
In order to make the above calculations feasible, the dimensions of the production and 
goods sectors were reduced. Accordingly, the original 97 activities and commodities 
accounts were aggregated into 10 separate activities and commodities accounts. The 
10 activities and commodities accounts consists of three agricultural accounts includ-
ing Rice, Other Agricultural Crops, and Livestock and Fishery, three industrial ac-
counts including Mining and Oil, Food Processing and Manufacturing, and four ser-
vice sectors including Water and Gas, Construction, Trade, and Other Services. Alto-
gether, the fully consistent micro-household SAM data set therefore contains 10 ac-
tivities, 10 commodities, 14 factors, 6,002 households, and three enterprises, in addi-
tion to accounts for the current government budget, capital accumulation, inventories, 
and the balance of payments. The creation of the full SAM data set might be viewed 
as a two-step procedure, whereby a consistent SAM with 16 aggregate households 
was established in the first step, while the full disaggregation into 6,002 micro house-
holds was left to the second step. The two-step procedure was preferable in the cur-
rent case, since it broke one large and unmanageable statistical balancing problem 
into 16 smaller and more manageable balancing problems. An important aspect of our 
procedure is that it allows for reconciling micro household income and expenditure 
information with more reliable macro totals. 
 
Our two models are standard static CGE models along the lines of the model used in 
Arndt, Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2000). It specifies a Cobb-Douglass production 
function of value added, and a Leontief specification for determining intermediate 
demand. In addition, it specifies a Linear Expenditure System (LES) for household 
consumption including home consumption of goods at the activity level and marketed 
consumption of goods at the commodity level. Finally, it includes a Constant Elastic-
ity of Transformation (CET) function for determining the supply of goods for the ex-
port market, and an Armington (CES) specification for determining the demand for 
imported goods. The LES expenditure system was implemented by assuming zero 
minimum consumption levels. Furthermore, the CET and CES functional relation-
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ships were implemented by assuming that transformation and substitution elasticities 
for the 10 Vietnamese commodities are similar to estimates derived for Mozambique 
in Arndt, Robinson and Tarp (2001). In general, the closures of the two models in-
clude full employment of factor resources, savings-driven investment, as well as a 
flexible exchange rate and fixed foreign savings inflows. The closure of the govern-
ment budget varies with the set of experiments, but for most experiments in this paper 
a standard revenue-neutral closure where flexible household tax rates make up for lost 
revenue from reduced trade taxes is used. Finally, the consumer price index for mar-
keted goods is used as price numeraire. 
 
The two models were implemented on the basis of the VSAM data set with (i) 16 ag-
gregate household categories and (ii) 6,002 disaggregate micro-households. The latter 
disaggregate model allows for endogenous derivation of the entire distribution of in-
come and consumption expenditures. The methodology of the former aggregate 
model was to carry out experiments and measure relative price effects at the aggre-
gate level, before studying distributional effects at the micro level. In the current set-
up, important distributional effects might arise from using the simple top-down ap-
proach. Accordingly, the distribution of income and expenditures changes when 
changing relative factor prices lead to changing factorial income for each of the 6,002 
micro households. One problem with calculating micro changes in expenditures from 
micro changes in income is that micro-household goods demand will be inconsistent 
with aggregate household goods demand. The current paper circumvents this problem 
by additively adjusting average expenditure shares for micro-households to match 
consumption by the aggregate household categories. This is seen as a reasonable way 
to maintain consistency since it is likely to maintain the relative ranking of micro-
households in terms of welfare increases. 
 
In the next section, we implement the two aggregate and disaggregate CGE models to 
study how changes in trade taxes affect poverty at the micro level. Poverty measures 
are calculated on the basis of an updated poverty line for 2000, derived from the Cost 
of Basic Needs (CBN) methodology. The updated poverty line for 2000, which ac-
counts for basic food and non-food expenditures, amounts to 1.68 million Dong or 
approximately 120US$ per year. The poverty line for 2000 updates the official pov-
erty line for 1998, i.e. 1.65 million Dong, based on official price changes for food and 
non-food items.2  
                                                 
2 These poverty lines are measured in local currency terms and are not corrected to take account for 
possible systematic divergence from purchasing power parity. This might explain the very low 
level of the poverty lines. 
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Different dimensions of poverty can be analysed using the traditional Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) measures of poverty headcount (P0), poverty gap (P1), and poverty 
depth (P2). These measures are convenient since they allow for simple additive de-
compositions among household groupings with different characteristics. While the 
FGT measures are widely used measures of poverty, we introduce additional adjusted 
measures of poverty gap (P1*) and poverty depth (P2*) to study the impact on pov-
erty among poor individuals. The FGT poverty headcount (P0) measure provides im-
mediate information on the relative number of poor individuals within a specific 
household grouping. Normalising on the total population of the particular grouping 
provides relevant information in this case. 
 
However, normalising on the total group population does not provide relevant infor-
mation in the case of the FGT poverty gap measure (P1). The practise of normalizing 
the P1 measure on the total group population implies that a populous region can seem 
to have a lower poverty gap than a less populous region, even if the reverse is true. In 
fact, the FGT measure provides a multiplicative measure (P1=P0xP1*), which is not 
comparable across different household groupings, since P0 differ between groupings. 
The FGT measure of poverty depth (P2) encounters the same normalisation problem. 
The impaired comparability between regions, and by extension between countries, 
implies that the traditional P1 and P2 measures are not suitable for comparative work. 
This includes standard eye-balling of simulation results as well as cross-country re-
gression analyses. In contrast, the adjusted FGT poverty measure P1* and P2* has the 
clear interpretation of measuring the average distance resp. squared distance to the 
poverty line among poor individuals. In this way, the adjusted measures yield relevant 
information, comparable across regions and countries. 
 
One interesting feature about the traditional FGT poverty gap measure (P1) is that 
relative changes in this measure reflect relative changes in the monetary poverty gap 
(POVGAP), defined as the total amount necessary to raise the income of every poor 
individual to the poverty line level (NxP1xPOVLINE). 3 Given a constant household 
group population and a constant poverty line, the relative change in the monetary 
poverty gap is given by dPOVGAP/POVGAP = d(NxP1xPOVLINE)/ 
(NxP1xPOVLINE) = d(P1)/P1. While this is an interesting feature of P1, it would be 
more appropriate to use the monetary poverty gap measure itself to represent these 
relative changes. In what follows, we will rely on the poverty headcount (P0), the ad-
                                                 
3 P1* is the poverty gap measure which is normalised on the number of poor individuals in a par-
ticular household grouping (N*), in contrast to P1 which is normalised on the total population of 
the household grouping (N). 
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justed poverty gap among poor individuals (P1*), the adjusted poverty depth among 
poor individuals (P2*) and the monetary poverty gap (POVGAP), to analyse the pov-
erty impact of trade liberalization.  
 
The results of our experiments with trade policies are presented in the next section. 
The impact on different dimensions of poverty is studied in the aggregate and at a re-
gional level by grouping households into three regions, i.e. northern, central, and 
southern Vietnam. Additional analyses study more detailed groupings of households 
according to: (i) rural/urban location, and (ii) farmer/self-employed/wage-
worker/non-employed employment status of the head of household. These groupings 
were chosen because of their significance in policy debates. They also reflect the 
household groupings in the aggregate VSAM data set. Other groupings could be stud-
ied equally well, e.g. groupings at the level of the 61 Vietnamese provinces, or ac-
cording to household size and composition.  
3. Results 
Table 3.1 presents the set of trade policy experiments carried out in the current paper. 
The base run experiment replicates the underlying 2000 Vietnam SAM data set; ex-
periment 1 measures the impact of eliminating export taxes; experiment 2 measures 
the impact of eliminating import tariffs; while experiment 3 measures the combined 
impact of eliminating all trade taxes. The set of experiments are common to the sub-
sections 3.1 and 3.2. Issues such as the specification of the government budget clo-
sure, the use of micro household data for poverty analysis, and the proper calculation 
of poverty indices are addressed in section 3.1. Subsequently, a more elaborate analy-
sis of the impact of trade liberalisation on the distribution of welfare and poverty is 
undertaken in section 3.2. This analysis is based on results from the model with 6,002 
endogenous micro households, assuming a revenue-neutral government budget clo-
sure.  
 
Table 3.1 Trade Tax Experiments 
  
Base run Calibrated 2000 SAM values 
Exp. 1 Elimination of export taxes 
Exp. 2 Elimination of import tariffs 
Exp. 3 Exp. 1 & 2 
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3.1. Government Budget Closure, Poverty Measures, and Endogenous Micro 
Households 
Table 3.2 presents the impact of trade liberalisation on monetary poverty gaps, when 
(i) micro households are modelled endogenously, and (ii) micro household data are 
used in a two-step procedure to calculate the poverty gaps. The elimination of export 
taxes has little impact on regional monetary poverty gaps, regardless of the treatment 
of micro households. It is, however, worth noting that the overall impact switches 
sign, when micro households are modelled endogenously. The elimination of import 
tariffs has a relatively large negative impact on monetary poverty gaps. Monetary 
poverty gaps increase in every region, but the endogenous modelling of micro-
households income and expenditure decisions has an important dampening effect. The 
overall increase in monetary poverty gap is 1.3 percent with endogenous micro 
households and 2.3 percent with exogenous micro households. This shows that feed-
back effects are important in determining the poverty impact of trade liberalisation. 
 
Table 3. 2. Monetary Poverty Gaps, and Endogenous Micro Households 
 (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
Micro Households Region
Base run
(1012 Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
North 5.729 -0.3 1.1 0.9
Central 4.949 -0.1 1.1 1.0
South 2.848 -0.2 1.9 1.8Endogenous 
Total 13.526 -0.2 1.3 1.1
 
North 5.729 -0.1 2.1 2.1
Central 4.949 0.1 2.0 2.2
South 2.848 0.2 3.4 3.7Exogenous 
Total 13.526 0.1 2.3 2.5
 
 
 
This conclusion is reinforced when looking at the combined third experiment, where 
all trade taxes are eliminated simultaneously. In this case, the monetary poverty gap 
increases by 1.1 percent with endogenous households and by 2.5 percent with exoge-
nous households. These numbers confirm that the endogenous modelling of micro 
household income and expenditure decisions is important. The ranking of the regional 
impact does not depend on the modelling choice - the monetary poverty gap increases 
relatively more in the south compared to the central and northern regions. This is re-
lated to the fact that southern households pay higher taxes and therefore have to bear 
a higher burden when lost trade tax revenues have to be replenished from domestic 
sources. 
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Table 3.3 presents the impact of trade liberalisation on monetary poverty gaps, using 
the model with endogenous micro households. The table compares results for differ-
ent choices of government budget closure, including (i) a non-revenue neutral closure 
where household tax rates are kept fixed, and (ii) a revenue-neutral closure where 
household tax rates are allowed to vary proportionately. The results show that the 
choice of government budget closure is very important in determining the poverty 
impact of trade liberalisation in the short- to medium-term. When the government 
sterilises the budget impact of declining trade tax revenues, regional monetary pov-
erty gaps generally tend to increase. In contrast, if the government allows for a partly 
non-sterilised revenue decrease, monetary poverty gaps will decline relatively 
strongly. If no sterilisation takes place, the overall monetary poverty gap will decrease 
by almost nine percent. The regional ranking of poverty is also affected by the gov-
ernment closure. When no sterilisation takes place, the largest relative decline in 
monetary poverty gap will occur in the relatively developed southern province, while 
the less developed central and northern provinces will benefit less. This shows that 
poor households in the southern province will benefit the most from pure trade liber-
alisation. On the other hand, replenishment of government income through increased 
domestic revenue collection will put large burdens on poor southern households. In 
this case, households from the southern provinces will be worse off than other re-
gional household groups after trade liberalisation. 
  
Table 3.3.  Monetary Poverty Gaps, and Government Budget Closure 
 (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
Govt Budget Closure Region
Base run
(1012 Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
North 5.729 -0.3 1.1 0.9
Central 4.949 -0.1 1.1 1.0
South 2.848 -0.2 1.9 1.8Fixed Revenues 
Total 13.526 -0.2 1.3 1.1
 
North 5.729 -2.3 -6.1 -8.3
Central 4.949 -2.2 -6.0 -8.1
South 2.848 -3.1 -8.4 -11.4Flexible Revenues 
Total 13.526 -2.4 -6.5 -8.9
 
 
 
Table 3.4 presents the impact of trade liberalisation on traditional and adjusted pov-
erty gap measures, using the model with endogenous micro households. The table 
compares the impact on the traditional FGT poverty gap measure, which is normal-
ised on the total group population, to the adjusted FGT poverty gap measure, which is 
normalised on the number of poor individuals in the group. It is clear from the base 
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run calculations that the two poverty gaps give rise to different pictures of the disper-
sion of poverty among Vietnamese regions. While the traditional FGT measure (P1) 
indicates that the poverty gap is highest in the central region of the country, the ad-
justed measure (P1*) indicates that poverty gaps are equally high among the central 
and northern regions, and relatively high in the southern region as well. This shows 
how the practise of normalizing the P1 measure on the total group population implies 
that a populous region will seem to have a lower poverty gap than a less populous re-
gion, even if the reverse is true. This observation implies that the traditional FGT 
poverty gap measure is not comparable between different household groupings. 
 
Table 3. 4. Traditional and Adjusted FGT Poverty Gap Measures (Percentage 
Changes) 
      
 
Poverty Measure 
 
Region
Base run
(1012 Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
North 0.121 -0.3 1.1 0.9
Central 0.141 -0.1 1.1 1.0
South 0.060 -0.2 1.9 1.8P1 
Total 0.104 -0.2 1.3 1.1
 
North 0.351 -0.7 -1.2 -1.1
Central 0.348 -0.4 0.2 -0.1
South 0.275 0.0 1.5 1.4P1* 
Total 0.331 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1
 
 
 
Looking at the results, it can be noticed that the percentage changes for the traditional 
P1 measure matches the percentage changes for the monetary poverty gaps in Tables 
3.2 and 3.3. This follows since (i) the real poverty line is unchanged, and (ii) the 
group populations are unchanged. Accordingly, the elimination of export taxes leads 
to uniformly small declines in poverty gaps, while the elimination of import tariffs 
leads to stronger increases in poverty gaps. This picture changes when looking at the 
adjusted poverty gap measure. Average poverty gaps generally decline or stay un-
changed for poor individuals in the northern and central regions. The average poverty 
gap only increase along with the traditional poverty gap measure for the southern re-
gion. The economy-wide adjusted poverty gap measure shows that the elimination of 
trade taxes has little impact on average poverty gaps among poor individuals. This 
shows that increasing monetary poverty gaps follow from increasing numbers of poor 
individuals rather than increasing average poverty gaps among the poor. 
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3.2. Trade liberalisation analyses 
Having analysed the importance of different aspects of our modelling methodology in 
section 3.1, we now turn to a more in depth analysis of how trade liberalisation will 
affect the Vietnamese economy at macro- and micro-levels. Based on our findings in 
section 3.1, we decided to use the model with endogenous micro households and 
revenue-neutral government budget closure for the more in-depth analysis. Our 
macro-economic analyses will be focussed on how macroeconomic aggregates and 
relative price changes affect the distribution of welfare among aggregate household 
groups. Our micro-economic analyses will focus on using the adjusted FGT measures 
and monetary poverty gaps to analyse the distribution of poverty among varying 
groups of poor households. 
 
Tables 3.5-3.11 present the macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation in Vietnam. 
The macroeconomic indicators, presented in Table 3.5, show that the elimination of 
trade taxes will have little macroeconomic impact on the Vietnamese economy. Real 
GDP expands marginally due to improved efficiency in the allocation of otherwise 
fixed factor stocks, while nominal GDP declines marginally. Moreover, nominal ab-
sorption declines marginally indicating that the overall welfare level of Vietnamese 
people will decrease only slightly in the short- to medium-term.  
 
Table 3.5.  Macroeconomic Indicators (Percentage Changes 
 
 
 
Base run
(1012 Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
Real GDP 444.7 0.0 0.1 0.1
Nominal GDP 444.7 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Nominal Absorption 455.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
 
 
 
Table 3.6 shows how the composition of real GDP changes with trade liberalisation. 
The two consumption items, including home and marketed consumption, decline, 
while investment and trade aggregates expand. The simultaneous reductions in con-
sumption and increases in investment come about as household tax income replaces 
the tax revenue of the government lost due to trade liberalization. The burden of trade 
taxes is partly borne by enterprises through reduced returns to capital. The sole reli-
ance on household taxes to make up for lost revenue therefore releases funds for en-
terprises. These funds are partly used to increase savings and accordingly investment. 
In contrast, household consumption has to be reduced along with household dispos-
able income since the increased tax-burden more than outweighs increased factor in-
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come. Trade aggregates expand in parallel, due to trade-tax induced changes in rela-
tive export and import prices, to maintain a fixed balance of payments. 
 
Table 3.6.  Components of Real GDP (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
 
Base run
(1012 Dong)
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
Home Consumption 23.4 0.0 -2.0 -2.0
Marketed Consumption 272.5 -0.3 -0.8 -1.1
Recurrent Govt. 28.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment and stocks 130.9 0.7 2.3 3.0
Exports 241.4 0.6 1.6 2.2
Imports -251.7 0.5 1.6 2.1
Real GDP 444.7 0.0 0.1 0.1
 
 
 
Table 3.7 shows how the elimination of trade taxes leads to increasing export prices 
and decreasing import prices. The elimination of export taxes leads to lower export 
prices as perceived by domestic producers, while the elimination of import tariffs 
leads to lower import prices as perceived by domestic consumers. Subsequently, 
higher export prices and lower prices on (imported) intermediate inputs drive domes-
tic producer and value added prices up, while declining import prices drive domestic 
demand prices down. The real exchange rate depreciates slightly to accommodate the 
pressure for an expansion of the current account deficit. Finally, Table 3.7 shows how 
the numeraire consumer price index for marketed goods remains unchanged. 
 
Table 3.7.  Price Indices (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
 
Base run
(Index) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
GDP  100.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Producer 100.0 0.3 1.5 1.7
Demand 100.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
Value added 100.0 1.0 3.6 4.7
Export  100.0 0.9 3.2 4.1
Import 100.0 -0.9 -2.6 -3.5
Consumer 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Traded goods 100.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Non-traded goods 100.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
Real Exchange Rate 100.0 0.2 0.4 0.5
 
 
 
Table 3.8 presents relative agricultural price indices to judge the transmission of rela-
tive price changes through the economy. The elimination of export taxes and import 
tariffs leads to increases in relative agricultural export and import prices. Relative ag-
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ricultural export prices increase in experiment 1 since agricultural exports are more 
heavily taxed than other exports. Similarly, relative agricultural import prices increase 
in experiment 2, since agricultural trade protection is lower than for other non-
agricultural sectors. The former increase in export prices lead to increasing relative 
producer and value added prices for agricultural output, while the latter increase in 
relative import prices leads to declining relative value added prices The overall effect 
of eliminating all trade taxes in experiment 3 is to increase relative agricultural pro-
ducer prices but lower relative agricultural value added prices. Increasing relative im-
port and producer prices also leads to increasing relative consumer prices for agricul-
tural goods. This explains why the cost of living indices presented below tend to in-
crease more for rural compared to urban households. 
 
Table 3.8. Agricultural Terms of Trade (Percentage Changes)  
 
 
 
Base run
(Index) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
Domestic/Export Composite 100.0 0.4 0.6 0.9
Domestic/Import Composite 100.0 0.0 2.0 2.1
Value Added 100.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.3
Export  100.0 3.6 0.0 3.6
Import 100.0 0.0 0.9 0.9
Consumer (marketed) 100.0 -0.3 1.7 1.3
 
 
 
Table 3.9 shows that cost of living indices, including the impact of changes in the 
value of home consumption, vary little across households. The elimination of export 
taxes has virtually no effect on cost of living indices. In contrast, the elimination of 
import tariffs raises the implicit cost of home consumption, and therefore leads to 
small increases in cost of living for most households. Similarly, the cost of living is 
increased for most households when all trade taxes are eliminated. The combined ex-
periment 3 shows that the cost of living increases slightly more for rural households 
compared to urban households. This is consistent with the relative increase in agricul-
tural consumer prices, which was observed above, and the fact that rural households 
have relatively large agricultural consumption shares. 
 
Table 3.10 shows that factor prices generally change in parallel, but also that some 
variation occur due to differences in relative factor intensities among production ac-
tivities. Agricultural production activities and construction have relatively high male 
factor intensities, while food processing, manufacturing, trade and other services have 
relatively high female factor intensities. Capital intensities are relatively low in agri-
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cultural production activities and relatively high in Oil production/Mining and in the 
supply of Water and Gas, while land is used exclusively in agricultural production. 
The elimination of relatively high agricultural export tax rates leads to increasing rela-
tive agricultural producer and value added prices. This spills over into relative in-
creases in wages for rural and urban males with low education, and returns to land, 
which are all used relatively intensively in agricultural production. The expansion of 
real investment due to increased enterprise savings also benefits male wages, while 
(urban) female wage increases are below average, since the female factor intensity is 
particularly low in construction.  
 
Table 3.9. Cost of Living Indices (Percentage Changes  
 
 
Household 
Base run
(Index) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
Rural male farm 100.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Rural male self-employed 100.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Rural male wage 100.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Rural male non-employed 100.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Rural female farm 100.0 -0.1 0.2 0.1
Rural female self-employed 100.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Rural female wage 100.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Rural female non-employed 100.0 0.2 1.1 1.3
 
Urban male farm 100.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0
Urban male self-employed 100.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1
Urban male wage 100.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0
Urban male non-employed 100.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1
Urban female farm 100.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1
Urban female self-employed 100.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Urban female wage 100.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0
Urban female non-employed 100.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1
 
 
Experiment 2 shows that the elimination of import tariffs has a similar differentiated 
impact on relative factor prices. Male wages tend to increase relative to female wages. 
Import tariff collection is concentrated in food processing and manufacturing. The 
elimination of these tariffs has a a negative effect on relative female wages, since it 
leads to reduced protection in these sectors. This effect is reinforced by the expansion 
of real investment which leads to increasing demand for male factors and increasing 
relative male wages. Returns to highly educated male labour increases particularly 
strongly, since construction has a high factor intensity for this labour category. The 
factor price movements in the combined experiment 3 reflect the sum of the factor 
price movements in the two separate experiments 1 and 2. Male wages increase rela-
tive to female wages, and highly educated male wages increase the most. Returns to 
capital increase above average and returns to land increase below average, since the 
elimination of import tariffs raise relative non-agricultural value added prices. 
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Table 3.10. Factor Prices (Percentage Changes  
     
 
Production Factor 
Base run
(Index) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
Rural male low education 100.0 1.3 3.5 4.8
Rural male med education 100.0 1.3 3.8 5.0
Rural male high education 100.0 1.2 4.1 5.3
Rural female low education 100.0 0.9 3.5 4.3
Rural female med education 100.0 0.8 3.5 4.3
Rural female high education 100.0 0.9 3.4 4.3
 
Urban male low education 100.0 1.1 3.2 4.2
Urban male med education 100.0 0.9 3.9 4.8
Urban male high education 100.0 0.7 4.2 5.0
Urban female low education 100.0 0.6 3.6 4.3
Urban female med education 100.0 0.5 3.8 4.3
Urban female high education 100.0 0.5 3.8 4.3
 
Capital 100.0 1.0 4.2 5.2
Land 100.0 1.6 1.9 3.5
 
 
 
Table 3.11 presents measures of equivalent variation for each of the 16 aggregate 
household types.4 It appears that only non-employed households and urban house-
holds with a wage-earning female head gain from the combined elimination of trade 
taxes in experiment 3. Urban households with a wage-earning male head of household 
also gain slightly from the elimination of import tariffs, but loose marginally when all 
trade taxes are eliminated. In general, household groupings with employed heads of 
household loose out from our experiments. The government makes up for lost trade 
tax revenue by increasing household taxes, and this puts added burden on the tax-
ridden employed households, since the initial incidence of trade taxes was borne 
partly by enterprises. The combination of increased household tax rates and increased 
cost of living hurts rural households with an employed head of household the most. 
The loss of welfare is particularly strong for rural households with a self-employed 
head of household, as well as urban households with a male farmer as head of house-
hold. 
 
The remainder of this section is dedicated to studying the micro-economic impact on 
the distribution of poverty among varying groups of poor households. Table 3.12 pre-
sents the impact of trade liberalisation on poverty indices and monetary poverty gaps 
at the regional level. The overall headcount ratio in the base run indicates that the to-
tal number of poverty-stricken people amounts to 31.3 percent of the Vietnamese 
                                                 
4 The equivalent variation measures are calculated from trade tax experiments with aggregate 
households, i.e. without endogenous micro household behaviour. 
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population. Given a total population of 77.6 million in Vietnam, this translates into 
24.3 million people living in poverty. The highest concentrations of poverty-stricken 
individuals are to be found in the central and northern parts of Vietnam, where re-
spectively 40.3 and 34.3 percent of the population live in poverty. Given regional 
population totals of 20.9 and 28.3 million, it follows that there are 8.4 million pov-
erty-stricken individuals living in the central provinces, and 9.7 million people living 
below the poverty-line in the North. In contrast, only around 6.2 million poverty-
stricken people are living in the populous southern provinces, boasting a total popula-
tion of 28.4 million. Altogether, poverty is most widespread in the northern region, 
and least widespread in the southern region. 
 
Table 3.11. Equivalent Variation (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
Household 
Base run
(1012 Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
Rural male farm 99.3 -0.2 -1.4 -1.7
Rural male self-employed 23.4 -0.6 -2.7 -3.5
Rural male wage 19.0 -0.2 -1.2 -1.5
Rural male non-employed 0.5 -0.3 1.1 1.4
Rural female farm 21.1 -0.1 -0.9 -1.0
Rural female self-employed 5.9 -0.8 -1.8 -2.7
Rural female wage 3.1 -0.2 -1.0 -1.1
Rural female non-employed 0.2 -0.5 -7.6 -8.0
 
Urban male farm 7.3 -0.6 -2.4 -3.0
Urban male self-employed 30.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8
Urban male wage 34.7 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
Urban male non-employed 1.0 -0.2 1.1 0.7
Urban female farm 4.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.5
Urban female self-employed 23.9 -0.3 -0.0 -0.4
Urban female wage 19.8 -0.2 0.3 0.2
Urban female non-employed 1.4 -0.6 2.6 1.9
 
 
 
The experiments indicate that the elimination of export taxes and import tariffs per se 
will do little to raise people out of poverty, if the government responds with increased 
taxation at the household level. The elimination of export taxes will, by itself, raise a 
small number of individuals above the poverty line in the southern region. However, 
the main impact will be to raise the number of poor people in the central and, in par-
ticular northern provinces. Overall, the elimination of import tariffs will move 1.3 
percent or 320,000 people into poverty. Experiment 2 indicates that more than half of 
these people (235,000) live in the North, while less than 10 percent (25,000) live in 
the populous southern provinces. Interestingly, the overall number of poor individuals 
does not change when export taxes are eliminated on top of import tariffs. Experiment 
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3 shows that a non-linear decrease in the number of poor individuals in the North 
even out with an increase in poor individuals located in central provinces. 
 
Table 3.12. Regional Households, Poverty Indices and Monetary Poverty Gaps 
(Percentage Changes)  
      
 
Measure Region
Base run
(Rate/Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
North 0.343 0.4 2.4 2.0
Central 0.404 0.2 0.8 1.1
South 0.217 -0.2 0.4 0.4P0 
Total 0.314 0.2 1.3 1.3
 
North 0.351 -0.7 -1.2 -1.1
Central 0.348 -0.4 0.2 -0.1
South 0.275 0.0 1.5 1.4P1* 
Total 0.331 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1
 
North 0.177 -0.8 -0.5 0.1
Central 0.161 -0.4 1.0 -0.4
South 0.106 -0.0 2.0 -0.1P2* 
Total 0.154 -0.5 0.6 -0.1
 
North 5.729 -0.3 1.1 0.9
Central 4.949 -0.1 1.1 1.0
South 2.848 -0.2 1.9 1.8
POVGAP 
(1012 Dong) 
Total 13.526 -0.2 1.3 1.1
 
 
 
The adjusted FGT poverty gap (P1*) measures indicate, as already discussed in rela-
tion to Table 3.4, that average poverty gaps among the poor are relatively high in the 
northern and central regions, amounting to around 35 percent of the poverty line, and 
lower in the southern provinces where it amounts to around 27.5 percent of the pov-
erty line. The results show that average poverty gaps among poor individuals will de-
crease in the northern provinces, remain unchanged in central provinces, and increase 
in southern provinces. This suggests that trade liberalisation will even out regional 
differences in poverty gaps among the poor. The economy-wide impact shows a small 
decline of 0.1 percent. This implies that the strong 1.1 percent increase in the overall 
monetary poverty gap, equivalent to an increase of 153 billion Dong or approx. 
US$11 million, is due mainly to an increase in the number of impoverished individu-
als. 
 
The regional measures of poverty depth among poor (P2*) indicate that the northern 
and central provinces have not only the largest poverty gap but also the largest pov-
erty depth. The elimination of export taxes will, by itself, reduce average poverty 
depth in the North, while the elimination of import tariffs, by itself, will increase pov-
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erty depth among poor in the southern provinces. The complete elimination of trade 
taxes will, however, not affect regional average poverty depth measures significantly. 
At the economy-wide level, this indicates that the main impact of trade liberalisation 
under the current government closure, will be to increase the number of poor indi-
viduals, leaving economy-wide average poverty gap and poverty depth among poor 
unchanged. At the regional level, the distribution poor individuals will be further 
skewed towards the northern and central provinces, but average poverty gaps will be 
more similar. Overall, the relative increase in monetary poverty gap for the southern 
provinces indicate that the elimination of trade taxes will even out regional differ-
ences in poverty levels. 
 
Tables 3.13-3.17 present adjusted FGT poverty measures and monetary poverty gaps 
for varying sub-samples of our micro households defined by location (rural/urban), 
sex of the head of household (male/female), and the employment status of the head of 
household (wage-worker/self-employed/farmer). The data presented in Table 3.13 in-
dicate that poverty is concentrated among households located in rural areas. Compar-
ing rural headcount measures (P0) to regional headcount totals in Table 3.12, rural 
poverty headcount measures are uniformly above average across all regions. The data 
indicate that the share of poverty-stricken individuals in rural areas amount to 41.1 
percent of in the northern region, 46.2 percent in the central region, and 29.8 percent 
in the southern region. In contrast, the data presented in Table 3.14 indicate that the 
share of poverty-stricken individuals in urban areas amount to only 5.6 percent in the 
northern region, 4.9 percent in the central region, and 2.3 percent in the southern re-
gion.  
 
Since poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon, it is not surprising that rural poverty gap 
and poverty depth measures mirror the economy-wide measures. Accordingly, aver-
age poverty gap and poverty depth among poor individuals is highest in northern and 
central region rural areas, and lower in southern region rural areas. A slightly differ-
ent picture emerges for the smaller group of impoverished urban households, where 
average poverty gaps amount to around 25 percent in northern and southern prov-
inces, and only 17 percent in central provinces. This indicates that average poverty 
gaps between rural and urban areas are relatively homogenous in the southern prov-
inces, and very heterogenous in the central provinces.  
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Table 3.13. Rural Households, Poverty Indices and Monetary Poverty Gaps (Per-
centage Changes) 
      
 
Measure 
 
Region
Base run
(Rate/Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2
 
Exp. 3 
  
North 0.411 0.4 2.4 2.0 
Central 0.462 0.2 0.8 1.1 
South 0.298 -0.2 0.4 0.4 P0 
Total 0.389 0.2 1.3 1.3 
  
North 0.355 -0.7 -1.3 -1.1 
Central 0.351 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 
South 0.275 0.0 1.5 1.4 P1* 
Total 0.333 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 
  
North 0.180 -0.8 -0.5 0.1 
Central 0.163 -0.4 1.0 -0.4 
South 0.107 -0.1 2.0 -0.2 P2* 
Total 0.156 -0.5 0.6 -0.1 
  
North 5.601 -0.3 1.1 0.9 
Central 4.908 -0.1 1.0 1.0 
South 2.767 -0.2 1.9 1.8 
POVGAP 
(1012 Dong) 
Total 13.275 -0.2 1.2 1.1  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.14. Urban Households, Poverty Indices and Monetary Poverty Gaps (Per-
centage Changes) 
 
 
Measure Region
Base run
(Rate/Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
North 0.056 0.0 1.9 1.9
Central 0.049 0.0 0.0 0.0
South 0.023 0.0 0.0 0.0P0 
Total 0.038 0.0 0.9 0.9
 
North 0.250 -0.0 1.8 1.9
Central 0.171 1.2 2.4 3.7
South 0.254 0.9 1.9 2.9P1* 
Total 0.233 0.5 2.0 2.6
 
North 0.100 0.1 1.1 0.2
Central 0.053 1.1 0.6 1.2
South 0.083 1.1 1.6 1.3P2* 
Total 0.085 0.5 1.3 0.6
 
North 0.128 -0.0 3.7 3.8
Central 0.042 1.2 2.4 3.7
South 0.081 0.9 1.9 2.9
POVGAP 
(1012 Dong) 
Total 0.251 0.5 2.9 3.5
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The image of poverty being a rural phenomenon persists when we look at monetary 
poverty gaps. Noting that 60.9 million people live in rural areas, the total poverty gap 
(13,525 billion Dong) can be decomposed into a rural gap of approx. 13,275 billion 
Dong and an urban gap of 250 billion Dong. The rural gap can be further decomposed 
into a northern region rural gap of 5,600 billion Dong (US$400 million), a central re-
gion rural gap of 4,900 billion Dong (US$350 million), and a southern region rural 
gap of 2,800 billion Dong (US$200 million). This regional distribution of rural pov-
erty gaps closely resembles the distribution of economy-wide poverty gaps. These 
numbers compare to urban monetary poverty gaps in the order of 130 billion Dong 
(US$10 million) in provinces of the North, 4 billion Dong (US$3 million) in central 
provinces, and 80 billion Dong (US$6 million) in southern provinces. 
 
Since poverty is a rural phenomenon in Vietnam, the results presented in Table 3.13 
are very similar to the results on economy-wide poverty indicators presented in Table 
3.12. While elimination of export taxes has relatively minor effects on rural poverty, 
elimination of import tariffs increases rural poverty more visibly. The combined third 
experiment shows that trade liberalisation leads to increasing numbers of poverty-
stricken rural inhabitants, while the economy-wide average poverty gap and poverty 
depth among poor people is relatively unaffected. Nevertheless, regional differences 
in average rural poverty gaps are evened out to some extent. The impact on urban 
poverty is different from the impact on rural poverty in the sense that the economy-
wide numbers of poverty headcount and poverty depth increase modestly, while the 
average poverty gap increases strongly. The increase in the urban average poverty gap 
is particularly strong for the central provinces, implying that regional differences are 
also evened out somewhat in urban areas. Nevertheless, the strong increase in urban 
monetary poverty gap in the northern region indicates that while relative urban pov-
erty is evened out, absolute urban poverty is not. 
 
Comparing the poverty impact of trade liberalisation between rural and urban areas, it 
appears that the number of poor expands more rapidly in rural areas compared to ur-
ban areas. Trade liberalisation will therefore not help to reverse the rural poverty 
headcount bias in Vietnam, in the short- to medium term. However, the average pov-
erty gap and poverty depth measures do increase more rapidly in urban areas, indicat-
ing a more equal distribution of poverty among rural and urban areas after trade liber-
alisation. This conclusion is supported by the relatively strong 3.5 percent increase in 
the urban monetary poverty gap compared to the more modest 1.1 percent increase in 
the rural monetary poverty gap. Looking at absolute numbers, it is, however, clear 
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that the increase in rural poverty of 145 billion Dong (US$10 million) completely 
dominates the 8 billion Dong (US$0.6 million) increase in urban poverty.  
 
In Tables 3.15-3.17 we present another decomposition of our poverty measures ac-
cording to the employment status of the head of household. Our data indicate that 
47.9 million individuals live in farm households, and 15.2 million individuals have a 
self-employed head of household, while 14.2 million have a wage-earning head of 
household. The group of non-employed households account for the remaining 
300,000 individuals. Our data further indicate that poverty is most widespread among 
individuals living in farm households. The risk of being poor is 39.1 percent for indi-
viduals living in farm households, or more than double the risk for individuals be-
longing to the remaining population. The concentration of poverty in farm households 
is not, however, of the same order of magnitude as the concentration of poverty in ru-
ral areas. The average poverty gap (P1*) and the average poverty depth (P2*) are 
generally higher for farming households compared to households with a wage-earning 
and self-employed head, but not dramatically so. Accordingly, average poverty gaps 
vary between 30.5-33.6 percent of the poverty line. 
 
Table 3.15. Wage Earning Households, Poverty Indices and Monetary Poverty 
Gaps (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
Measure Region
Base run
(Rate/Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
North 0.153 4.4 7.8 7.8
Central 0.299 0.0 2.3 5.0
South 0.181 0.0 -1.3 -1.3P0 
Total 0.199 0.9 1.8 2.7
 
North 0.321 -4.3 -6.0 -5.9
Central 0.324 0.0 -0.8 -3.2
South 0.282 0.1 2.9 3.1P1* 
Total 0.305 -0.9 -0.4 -1.1
 
North 0.134 -4.4 -1.5 -0.1
Central 0.138 0.0 -0.6 -2.4
South 0.112 0.1 3.1 0.2P2* 
Total 0.125 -0.9 0.8 -0.8
 
North 0.327 -0.1 1.4 1.5
Central 0.518 0.0 1.4 1.5
South 0.603 0.1 1.5 1.7
POVGAP 
(1012 Dong) 
Total 1.448 0.0 1.5 1.6
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Table 3.16. Self-employed Households, Poverty Indices and Monetary Poverty 
Gaps (Percentage Changes) 
 
 
Measure Region
Base run
(Rate/Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
 
North 0.193 0.0 0.6 0.6
Central 0.260 2.1 4.0 2.1
South 0.129 0.0 0.0 0.0P0 
Total 0.180 0.7 1.6 0.9
 
North 0.403 -0.1 0.3 0.2
Central 0.328 -2.2 -2.7 -1.0
South 0.225 0.3 2.4 2.8P1* 
Total 0.319 -0.7 -0.3 0.4
 
North 0.231 -0.1 0.4 -0.0
Central 0.146 -2.3 0.0 1.7
South 0.080 0.2 2.3 0.4P2* 
Total 0.152 -0.8 0.7 0.7
 
North 0.614 -0.1 0.9 0.9
Central 0.523 -0.1 1.2 1.2
South 0.336 0.3 2.4 2.8
POVGAP 
(1012 Dong) 
Total 1.473 -0.0 1.3 1.4
 
 
 
Table 3.17. Farm Households, Poverty Indices and Monetary Poverty Gaps (Per-
centage Changes 
  
 
Measure Region
Base run
(Rate/Dong) Exp. 1 Exp. 2
 
Exp. 3 
  
North 0.421 0.2 2.1 1.7 
Central 0.464 0.0 0.2 0.4 
South 0.279 -0.3 1.0 1.0 P0 
Total 0.391 0.0 1.2 1.1 
  
North 0.347 -0.5 -1.0 -0.8 
Central 0.354 -0.1 0.8 0.5 
South 0.282 -0.0 0.9 0.7 P1* 
Total 0.336 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 
  
North 0.174 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 
Central 0.166 -0.2 1.4 -0.4 
South 0.109 -0.1 1.6 -0.3 P2* 
Total 0.157 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 
  
North 4.773 -0.3 1.1 0.9 
Central 3.882 -0.1 1.0 0.9 
South 1.897 -0.3 1.9 1.7 
POVGAP 
(1012 Dong) 
Total 10.552 -0.3 1.2 1.0 
 
 
 
The total monetary poverty gap of 13,525 billion Dong and the 24.4 million associ-
ated poverty-stricken individuals can be decomposed into poverty gaps of 10,550 bil-
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lion Dong (US$750 million) covering 18.7 million poor individuals belonging to the 
group of 47.9 million farm households, 1,500 billion Dong (US$110 million) cover-
ing 2.7 million poor individuals belonging to the group of 15.2 million households 
with a self-employed head, and another 1,450 billion Dong (US$105 million) cover-
ing 2.8 million poor individuals belonging to the group of 14.2 million households 
with a wage-earning head. Looking at poverty from this angle, it does appear that 
poverty in Vietnam is mainly a phenomenon affecting (rural) farming households. 
Nevertheless, it also appears that farm poverty bias is mainly a matter of poverty 
headcount rather than average poverty gaps among poor individuals. 
 
Looking at the experiments, it is clear that the poverty impact on individuals varies 
with the employment status of the head of household. A decomposition of the 
320,000 additional poverty-stricken individuals shows that 205,000 belong to farm 
households, while 25,000 belong to self-employed households and 80,000 to wage-
earning households. Moreover, a decomposition of the additional monetary poverty 
gap of 153 billion Dong (US$11 million) shows that poverty gaps increase by 110 bil-
lion Dong (US$8 million) for farm households, 20 billion Dong (US$1.3 million) for 
self-employed households, and 23 billion Dong (US$1.5 million) for wage-earning 
households. These numbers clearly indicate that the elimination of trade taxes has a 
strong absolute impact on poverty in farming households, but also that a large number 
of individuals with a wage-earning head of household will be pushed below the pov-
erty line. Furthermore, the numbers confirm that the expansion of the monetary pov-
erty gap in self-employed households follows from a combined expansion of the 
number of poor people and of the average poverty gap of these poor individuals. 
 
Table 3.15 indicates some regional differences in the level and depth of poverty 
among individuals with a wage-earning head of household. The total poverty gap of 
1,450 billion Dong covering 2.8 million poor individuals living in wage-earning 
households can be decomposed into poverty gaps of 330 billion Dong covering 
600,000 poor individuals in the northern region, 520 billion Dong covering 900,000 
poor individuals in the central region, and 600 billion Dong covering 1.3 million poor 
individuals in the southern region. Poverty among wage-earning households is there-
fore most widespread in the southern region, but the average poverty gap among poor 
individuals is higher in the central region. The 23 billion Dong increase in monetary 
poverty gap covering 80,000 additional poverty-stricken individuals living in wage-
earning households can be decomposed into: (i) 5 billion Dong covering 50,000 new 
poor in the northern region, (ii) 10 billion Dong covering 50,000 new poor in the cen-
tral region, and (iii) 10 billion Dong covering 20,000 new non-poor in the southern 
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region. It follows that the northern and central regions sees strong increases in poverty 
headcount and strong associated declines in average poverty gaps among poor indi-
viduals from self-employed households. Given the relatively high initial levels of the 
poverty headcount and average poverty gap in the central region, these relative 
changes tends towards a less equal regional distribution of poverty headcounts, and a 
more equal regional distribution of average poverty gaps among poor wage-earning 
households. Average poverty depth also tends to decline, implying a more equal re-
gional distribution of average poverty depth among poor wage-earning households. 
 
Table 3.16 indicates that there are large regional differences in the level and depth of 
poverty among self-employed households. A decomposition of the total 1,475 billion 
Dong poverty gap, covering 2.75 million poor individuals living in self-employed 
households, shows that some 615 billion Dong cover 910,000 poor individuals in the 
northern region, 525 billion Dong cover 950,000 poor individuals in the central re-
gion, while some 335 billion Dong cover 890,000 poor individuals in the southern re-
gion. Poverty among individuals living in wage-earning households is most wide-
spread in the central region. Nevertheless, the average poverty gap among poor indi-
viduals is clearly the highest in the northern region, and almost twice the average 
poverty gap among poor individuals in the southern region. Relative to these num-
bers, the poverty impact of trade liberalisation is moderate. The 20 billion Dong in-
crease in the poverty gap for self-employed households can be decomposed into 5 bil-
lion Dong covering 5,000 additional poor in the northern region, 5 billion Dong cov-
ering 20,000 additional poor in the central region, and 10 billion Dong covering no 
additional poor in the southern region. As was the case for wage-earning households, 
self-employed households experience a moderately high poverty headcount increase 
in the central region, and a moderately high average poverty gap increase in the 
southern region. While the increased poverty headcount in central provinces tends to 
reinforce the disproportionate share of poor self-employed individuals in this region, 
the increasing average poverty gap in southern provinces tends to even out regional 
differences in average poverty gaps among poor self-employed households. The in-
crease in average poverty depth in the central region, is of no major consequence to 
the regional distribution of average poverty depth among poor self-employed house-
holds. 
 
Finally, our data, summarized in Table 3.17, indicate that the total poverty gap of 
10,550 billion Dong covering 18.7 million individuals living in farm households can 
be decomposed into a poverty gap of 4,775 billion Dong covering 8.2 million poor 
individuals in the northern region, 3,875 billion Dong covering 6.5 million poor indi-
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viduals in the central region, and 1,900 billion Dong covering 4.0 million poor indi-
viduals in the southern region. These numbers indicate that poverty headcounts and 
average poverty gaps among poor individuals living in farm households are relatively 
high in the northern and central regions and relatively low in the southern region. Ap-
plying the percentage changes from Table 3.17 to the initial poverty measurements 
shows that the total additional poverty gap of 110 billion Dong covering 205,000 ad-
ditional poverty-stricken individuals from farm households, can be decomposed into 
additional poverty gaps of 40 billion Dong covering 140,000 additional poor indi-
viduals in the northern region, 35 billion Dong covering 25,000 additional poor indi-
viduals in the central region, and 35 billion Dong covering 40,000 additional poor in-
dividuals in the southern region. The relatively uniform increases in monetary poverty 
gaps and the increase in average poverty gap in the southern region tends to even out 
regional differences for farming households. However, the increasing poverty head-
count in the northern region tend to increase regional differences. Finally, changes in 
average poverty depth among poor farm households are small. 
 
Summing up, the increase in overall poverty headcount is primarily driven by increas-
ing poverty among farm households in the northern region. Altogether, they account 
for 140,000 out of a total 310,000 additional poverty-stricken individuals. The in-
creasing regional poverty headcount in the southern region is also strongly influenced 
by increasing poverty among farm households, while the increased poverty headcount 
in the central region is dominated by increasing poverty among wage- and self-
employed households. The increase in monetary poverty gaps is also dominated by 
farm households, both at the economy-wide and regional level, accounting for 110 
billion Dong of the additional 153 billion Dong monetary poverty gap. Nevertheless, 
the relatively strong increase in the monetary poverty gap of the southern region tends 
to even out regional differences in monetary poverty. Moreover, average poverty gaps 
among poor self-employed, wage-earning and farming households generally increase 
in southern provinces and decrease in northern provinces. This tends to even out re-
gional differences in average poverty gaps. Finally, changes in average poverty depth 
are relatively small for poor farm households and varying without a general tendency 
for poor self-employed and wage-earning households. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a methodology for measuring the poverty impact of macro 
policies within a CGE model framework, which does not rely on assumptions regard-
ing intra-household distributions of income. Income distribution was modelled em-
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pirically by disaggregating the household sector into a large number of micro house-
holds, each having different compositions of factor endowments implying rich ad-
justments to changes in relative factor prices. Our results show that feedback-effects 
from the micro level distribution of income and expenditures to macro level variables 
are important in determining the poverty impact of trade policy interventions. This 
implies that endogenous modelling of empirical income and expenditure distributions 
is an important step forward in analysing the impact of macro-policy interventions on 
the distribution of welfare and poverty. 
 
We also propose a new normalisation of traditional Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty 
measures to make them comparable across various household groupings. We argue 
that these adjusted poverty measures have an appropriate interpretation and give more 
relevant information than the traditional measures. Using these measures, we find that 
the poverty impact of eliminating trade taxes depends critically on the fiscal response 
of the government. In particular, the short- to medium term impact on poverty levels 
among the poor are inversely related to changes in investment expenditures. Overall 
welfare is relatively unchanged when measured by changes in total absorption. This 
suggests that the government can, and should, choose a combination of measures to 
make up for lost revenue from reduced trade taxes. At one extreme, we find that pov-
erty headcounts and poverty levels among the poor will increase if the government 
decides to make up for lost revenues by relying solely on increased household taxa-
tion. At the other extreme, we find that a policy of pure deficit financing of the ensu-
ing budgetary gap will lower the economy-wide monetary poverty gap by almost nine 
percent. We do not suggest that the government should allow trade liberalisation to be 
accompanied by an unbalancing of the budget. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that 
the government should exercise great care in choosing a proper fiscal response in or-
der to avoid increasing poverty in the short- to medium-term. 
 
The main part of our analysis was based on a standard revenue-neutral public finance 
closure where the government makes up for lost revenue by increasing household tax 
rates. Our results should therefore be interpreted as a worst case scenario. Altogether, 
our database indicates that 24.3 million individuals or 39 percent of the Vietnamese 
population have expenditures, which are lower than the poverty line of 1.68 million 
Dong (US$120) per year. Our database also indicates that poverty, measured by pov-
erty headcount and poverty gaps among the poor, is a rural phenomenon, and our ex-
periments indicate that the elimination of all trade taxes would (under the closure just 
referred to) push 1.3 percent or an additional 310,000 people into poverty. Almost 
half of these people live in rural farm households in the northern region, which al-
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ready has some 9.7 million poor inhabitants. This would imply a further worsening of 
regional discrepancies in poverty headcounts. On the other hand, regional monetary 
gaps would be more equal following this kind of trade liberalisation strategy, since 
the monetary poverty gaps in the southern provinces would increase relatively 
strongly. These distributional implications of reductions in trade taxes and associated 
changes in tax incidence suggest that the Vietnamese government should carefully 
consider its fiscal response to trade liberalisation. While replacing trade taxes with 
household income taxes will tend to even out some regional differences in poverty 
levels, it will also increase poverty levels in general. The government should therefore 
consider alternatives to increased household taxation, including increased enterprise 
taxation and/or reductions in expenditure levels, to accommodate their trade liberali-
sation efforts. 
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